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Executive Summary
The case for passing fast-track trade legislation is
simple: The most promising approach for advancing free
trade in today’s global economy is through negotiated trade
agreements, and those agreements will be difficult if not
impossible to reach if the president of the United States
is denied fast-track authority.
Free trade allows Americans to live freer and more
prosperous lives. Trade with other nations benefits
consumers with lower prices and more choice, while
producers gain export markets, new technology and lower-
cost inputs. Export-related jobs in the United States pay
more and are growing four times faster than non-export
jobs.
To promote free trade, Congress should pass a
"clean" fast-track bill, one that specifically forbids the
inclusion of labor and environmental standards in future
trade agreements. Adding labor and environmental issues to
the agenda would only provide another pretext for
protectionism.
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Introduction
Americans suffer a kind of schizophrenia toward trade with other nations. We
export more goods and services than any other nation, yet we endlessly worry about our
ability to “compete.” Our economy has created millions of net new jobs since 1980,
during a time of dramatically rising imports, while many Americans still believe more
imports mean fewer jobs. In the 50 years since the signing of the original General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Western nations have enjoyed a historic period of peace
and prosperity, yet the debate about trade today is full of the metaphors of war.
The current controversy in Washington about granting the president fast-track
authority for trade negotiations contains the same paradox.  The flow of goods, services,
and investment across our borders is booming, incomes are rising, and the unemployment
rate has fallen to a 25-year low. Yet the public is ambivalent about free trade1 and
Congress is deeply divided on renewal of fast-track authority.
Failure to pass fast-track authority to reduce trade barriers would be a mistake.
Congress should approve the authority for the president soon, without the baggage of
environmental and labor language.  If Congress fails to pass a clean fast-track bill,
agreements to liberalize trade will be virtually impossible for the president to negotiate.
Progress toward freer trade, economic integration, and a more efficient and prosperous
U.S. economy will be hindered.
Free Trade and America’s Future
Free trade, like the free market in general, allows people to live freer and more
prosperous lives. A policy of free trade reduces the power of government and special
interests to dictate the shape of an economy, leaving that task to the countless daily
decisions of decentralized producers and consumers in the global marketplace.
Free trade among nations increases global prosperity by allowing people to
specialize in what they produce relatively more efficiently. As Adam Smith argued more
than two centuries ago, it would be foolish for a family to insist on making its own shoes,
tailoring its own clothes, and growing all its own food when it could buy them more
cheaply from the shoemaker, tailor, and farmer. “What is prudence in the conduct of
every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country
can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of
them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we
have some advantage.”2
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3Trade with other nations allows American consumers to enjoy a wider range of
goods and services at lower cost than if we produced everything for ourselves. American
exporters gain through access to a much larger world market. The increased sales in a
global market can lead to lower costs through economies of scale, leading to lower prices,
yet more sales, and further efficiency gains, in what economists call a “virtuous cycle.”
Increased competition from imports spurs innovation among domestic firms while
protecting consumers from potential monopolies. For these reasons, nations that pursue
free trade policies tend to prosper while those that hide behind protectionist barriers
stagnate.3
The American economy has become increasingly intertwined with the rest of the
world. Since 1970, America’s total imports and exports in the broadest measure--goods,
services, and investment income--have increased from 13 percent of our gross domestic
product to nearly 30 percent.4 Today the United States is both the world’s largest exporter
and its largest importer.
Exports provide a livelihood for a growing share of American workers. During
the last decade, the number of jobs supported by exports rose four times faster than the
overall number of private-industry jobs, to more than 12 million. And export jobs, on
average, pay about 14 percent more than jobs in nonexport industries.5 While expanding
trade does not significantly affect the total number of jobs in an economy, it does tend to
raise the quality and pay of the jobs available.
Benefits of free trade spill beyond our own borders, creating a more peaceful and
prosperous world. Nations with strong commercial ties tend not to fight wars with each
other. As nations become more economically integrated with each other, the economic
cost of disrupting those ties through war rises dramatically. Free trade also has allowed
millions of people in less developed countries to rise out of poverty, proving itself far
more effective than failed and costly U.S. foreign aid programs.
Protectionism, in contrast, makes people poorer by raising prices and diverting
resources away from more efficient industries. When the U.S. government protects the
steel, automobile, textile, and sugar beet industries, it raises profits in those industries at
the expense of consumers. In the typical case where an industry gains protection, the
losses in efficiency and consumer welfare far outweigh the gains to the protected industry
and to the government--leaving the nation as a whole poorer.
Protection acts as a kind of tax, robbing from the mass of consumers for the
benefit of a narrow slice of producers. By concentrating power in the hands of
government officials, it breeds rent seeking by special interests. This is why protectionist
measures that were supposed to be temporary, such as the textile import-quota agreement
of 1962, tend to remain in force for years and decades after they were originally set to
expire. Protection becomes just another government subsidy, with consumers paying the
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products comes to about $1,500 a year for a family of four.6
One argument that cannot be made for free trade is that it benefits everyone
equally or immediately. The dislocation caused by trade can be painful for workers and
investors in industries that are becoming relatively less competitive. Our response to the
uneven effects of trade should not be protection but rather enhancement of the ability of
workers and business to adjust to change by making our domestic markets more flexible.
After all, technology itself causes dislocation. Consider what has happened to the
typewriter industry in the past 20 years, or the horse-and-buggy business in the 1920s.
Should the government attempt to “save jobs” by slowing the introduction of new
products and technology? That is essentially what protectionists want to do. Like modern
Luddites, opponents of free trade seek to slow economic progress at its source rather than
adjust to the consequences of a dynamic free market.     
Fast Track, Necessary Track
The case for fast-track authority is simple: The most promising approach for
advancing free trade in today’s international political economy is through negotiated
trade agreements, and those agreements will be difficult if not impossible to reach if the
President of the United States is denied fast-track authority.
Of course, negotiated agreements are not the only way to advance free trade. A
strong economic case can be made for unilateral trade liberalization. By lowering our
own barriers to trade regardless of what other countries do, the United States would make
its own economy more efficient and its citizens freer to control the fruits of their own
labor. It would also offer a powerful example to other nations of the benefits of an open
economy.7
Negotiated trade agreements can also advance economic liberty. By linking lower
barriers at home with reciprocal liberalization abroad, a country’s import consumers and
export industries can be brought together in a powerful protrade coalition. Agreements
also reduce the chances of a destructive trade war by effectively locking in lower trade
barriers through mutual agreement. Finally, it’s hard to argue with success. American
participation in eight rounds of GATT and in free-trade agreements with Canada and
Mexico has helped bring global trade barriers to historic lows and to keep them down.
Fast-track authority is not a gimmick. It allows the president to submit a
negotiated trade treaty to Congress for an up-or-down vote without the possibility of
amendment. Without assurance of a fast-track vote, foreign governments would find it
virtually impossible to negotiate with the U.S. executive branch because any treaty they
agreed to could be rewritten by Congress. Negotiations would be pointless.
Fast-track authority was first granted in the Trade Act of 1974. Since then every
U.S. president, from Gerald Ford to Bill Clinton, has been granted authority to negotiate
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approach to trade has yielded impressive fruit. Four major trade agreements have been
implemented since 1979 under fast-track authority: the Tokyo Round of GATT in 1979,
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1988, the North American Free Trade
Agreement with Mexico in 1993, and the Uruguay Round of GATT, signed in 1994.
Each of those agreements lowered tariff and nontariff barriers, opening new
markets for U.S. exporters and raising the living standards of U.S. consumers.  The
agreements have locked the gains of free trade into place, making it far less likely that the
major trading nations of the world will slip into a trade war as they did in the 1930s.  It is
almost certain that none of those trade-expanding agreements would have been possible
without the fast-track process.
One argument raised against the fast-track process is that it undermines the
constitutional power of Congress. Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution,
Congress holds the power  “to lay and collect … duties” and “to regulate commerce with
foreign nations.” Through fast-track authority, Congress designates the executive branch
as its chief negotiator, with the explicit understanding, written into law, that Congress
will be informed of the progress of negotiations and that any resulting agreement will be
considered under a “closed rule” barring amendments. Once a treaty has been signed by
the president, Congress retains the power to write the “implementing legislation” which
would conform U.S. law to the agreement.  Even after the legislation has been written,
Congress retains the ultimate power to vote the trade treaty down.
Executive branch participation in trade policy has evolved from bitter experience.
In 1930, Congress passed the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff bill, the most protectionist
piece of legislation in U.S. history. The Tariff Act of 1930 was the result of legislative
log-rolling, in which members of Congress agreed to support higher tariffs to benefit
industries in other states and districts in exchange for support for tariffs that benefited
their own special interests. The result was one part comical--including a 1,000 percent
tariff on cashew nuts even though the U.S. had no domestic cashew industry8--and n e
parts disaster. Passed in the name of job creation, the bill only plunged the country deeper
into the Great Depression. Other nations retaliated, predictably, by raising their own
tariffs, leading to a drastic fall in global trade.
Congress began to repair the damage of its protectionist binge by passing the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. This act granted the president the authority to
negotiate tariff reductions of up to 50 percent with other nations that were willing to
reduce their own tariff barriers. Like fast-track authority, the 1934 trade act shifted
authority from the legislative to the executive branch.  Arguably, it granted the president
even more leeway than current fast-track legislation by giving advance approval, within
limits, to negotiated tariff reductions.
Like the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act before it, fast-track authority is based
on the political reality that the chief executive can more effectively represent the nation’s
general welfare on trade issues than the legislative branch. Although all presidents,
6including Bill Clinton, are subject to pressure from special interest groups, on trade
matters the chief executive has a greater incentive than individual members of Congress
to consider the broad interests of consumers and the economy as whole.
“Clean” Fast Track Is the Only Way
Congress should pass a “clean” fast-track bill--that is, a bill without language that
could allow the president to include trade-restricting agreements on environment and
labor issues in a fast-track trade bill. Any language that would allow the president to hold
free trade hostage to labor and environmental demands should be rejected by Congress.
Free trade and rising labor and environmental standards are complementary, not
competing, objectives. The best way to promote higher standards around the world is to
promote free trade and the efficiencies it brings.
Working conditions in less developed countries cannot be raised by governm nt
fiat. If new labor regulations were all that were needed, countries such as Bangladesh
and Mexico could simply legislate a Western-style minimum wage, maximum workweek,
generous vacation time, and restrictions on employing children. But such regulations
would only create hardships and unemployment because workers in Third World
countries are simply not productive enough to justify the cost of the regulations. Rising
labor standards are the result of economic growth, not a cause, and free trade is one of the
principal ways of spurring growth.
The tie between free trade and better labor standards was confirmed in a 1996
study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the club
of  economically advanced countries. After analyzing core standards in more than 70
countries, the OECD concluded, “The strongest finding is that there is a positive
association over time between successfully sustained trade reforms and the improvement
in core [labor] standards.”9
The OECD study also undermined the mistaken belief that less developed
countries can capture export markets and attract foreign investment by systematically
lowering labor standards. It found that in most countries the level of core labor standards
made no real difference in the investment decisions of multinational companies or in the
country’s export performance.
The same logic applies to environmental standards. Nations adopt different
regulations for rational reasons. Poorer nations tend to have lower standards because they
simply cannot afford the luxury of imposing Western-style limits on air, water and other
forms of pollution. As living standards improve and more people rise above mere
subsistence, countries can afford to adopt more stringent environmental rules. Great
Britain, the United States, and other developed countries experienced the same transition
in the last century, as soot, sewage, and other pollution produced by the industrial
revolution was eventually curbed by the use of cleaner technology--technology made
possible and affordable by economic growth. Blocking trade with countries that fail to
7enforce American-style standards will slow economic growth in the target countries and
make those standards all the more difficult to attain.
The only real effect of ying trade to standards will be to arouse the resentment of
less developed countries. In August, the Rio Group of Latin American countries issued a
statement at their meeting in Paraguay that trade should not be intertwined with labor and
environmental demands. At the ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization in
Singapore last December, a decisive majority rejected the proposal of the United States to
saddle the WTO with policing international labor standards.
Compromise language approved by the Senate Finance and House Ways and
Means committees in early October 1997 would allow the president to negotiate trade
deals under fast-track authority in which the parties agreed not to loosen environmental
and labor standards to gain an advantage in trade. Specifically, the Ways and Means
version of the bill approved by the committee on October 8 states that a principal
negotiating objective of the United States in the area of labor and environment will be “to
ensure that foreign governments do not derogate from or waive existing domestic
environmental, health, safety, or labor measures, including measures that deter
exploitative child labor, as an encouragement to gain competitive advantage in
international trade or investment.”
At best this language is unnecessary. As the OECD study indicates, fears of a
“race to the bottom” are overblown. At worst the provision would reduce the ability of
governments to adapt their regulatory structures to meet changing economic conditions
and social preferences.
A clean fast-track bill, one without any reference to labor and environmental
standards, would not preclude the United States from pursuing labor and environmental
agreements through other channels. But it would prevent the president from abusing the
fast-track process by attaching labor and environmental legislation to a bill that cannot be
amended by Congress.
The driving purpose of the fast-track process is to open global markets to trade
and investment. Adding labor and environmental agreements to the agenda, especially if
they involve imposing sanctions for noncompliance, would have just the opposite effect,
providing yet another pretext for protectionism.
The Success of NAFTA
Despite what opponents of fast-track authority contend, the North American Free
Trade Agreement has been a success by any measure.  Trade among the United States,
Canada, and Mexico has flourished since the passage of NAFTA, benefiting American
consumers and exporters. Since 1993, two-way trade with our NAFTA partners has
increased by 44 percent, to $421 billion in 1996. That compares with a 33 percent
increase in American trade with all other countries.10 Mexico has now become America’s
second largest market for exports, just ahead of Japan and behind only Canada.
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NAFTA has been modestly beneficial for the U.S. economy, even though
Mexico’s economy is relatively small compared to the American economy. It is obvious
today that the “giant sucking sound” predicted by Ross Perot has not been heard. Since
the passage of NAFTA in 1993, the real gross domestic product of the United States has
expanded by 12 percent and civilian employment has grown by more than 8 million,
including a net increase of half a million jobs in manufacturing.11 Inflatio  has remained
subdued at 2 to 3 percent, thanks partly to the price competition of imports.
The job “losses” that critics of free trade blame on NAFTA are mostly fictitious,
based on the misuse of trade deficit numbers. About 150,000 Americans have filed for
benefits under a program for workers allegedly displaced by increased imports from
Mexico and Canada.12 As painful as the displacement may be for those workers, the U.S.
economy during the last four years has created that many net new jobs approximately
every three weeks.13
Nor has investment in the United States suffered since the passage of NAFTA.
Total nonresidential fixed investment in the United States has risen by one-third since
1993, from $600 billion to an annual rate of more than $800 billion so far in 1997. 14
Investment in the U.S. last year included $77 billion in direct foreign investment, making
the United States the No. 1 destination in the world for foreign capital. In contrast,
American direct investment in Mexico since the passage of NAFTA has averaged about
$3 billion a year, or less than one-half of 1 percent of the capital invested in the United
States during the same period.15 So much for a giant sucking sound.
Mexican Reforms on Track
Opponents of free trade blame NAFTA for Mexico’s painful peso crisis of 1994-
95. But the plunge in Mexico’s output in 1995 had nothing to do with free trade and
everything to do with politics and botched monetary policy. Mexico’s peso collapse was
caused by a lethal combination of loose monetary policy and an inflexible and overvalued
exchange rate, both aimed at boosting consumption in an election year. Indeed, Mexico
has suffered a severe financial crisis in every election cycle since 1976--long before
anyone had ever heard the term NAFTA.16 To blame the peso crisis on NAFTA makes no
more sense than to blame a drunken driver’s latest accident on his new car.
In reality, NAFTA and other market reforms softened the severity of the crisis and
spurred Mexico’s recovery. Today, the Mexican economy has resumed a growth rate of
more than 5 percent, the unemployment rate has fallen to precrisis levels and personal
consumption of goods and services is once again rising at a healthy, sustainable rate.17
This NAFTA-era recovery contrasts starkly with the protracted slump in Mexico
that followed the 1982 debt crisis. Then it took the Mexican economy six years to recover
its precrisis levels of production.18 More important, whereas the slump of 1982 prompted
9the Mexican government to nationalize its banks and raise trade barriers, the present
government successfully resisted backsliding. Just as NAFTA supporters on both sides of
the border had predicted, the trade treaty helped to lock in Mexico’s broader economic
reforms.
Food Safety No Cause for Alarm
Opponents of free trade and fast track have made an issue of food safety, arguing
that expanded agricultural trade with Mexico and other less-developed nations has
compromised U.S. health standards. The right response to any safety concerns should be
to improve inspection procedures, not to deny ourselves the obvious benefits of being
able to buy a wider range of fresh fruits and vegetables throughout the year at lower
prices. After all, food can pose a health hazard whether it is imported or produced
domestically, as the recent example of infected meat from a Nebraska plant
demonstrated. Using food safety as an excuse to close our doors to agricultural imports
could boomerang to hurt U.S. food exporters, who have also been accused of exporting
allegedly unsafe food.19
More Than NAFTA II
Without the renewal of fast-track authority, the United States will be unable to
move ahead on free-trade initiatives. Either the talks themselves will go nowhere, or
other nations will determine their shape while the U.S. government sits on the sideline.
Here are the major trade initiatives that depend on fast-track authority:
· In December 1994, President Clinton and the heads of 33 other nations in the Western
Hemisphere met in Miami and agreed to pursue a Free Trade Area of the Americas by
2005. The agreement would remove artificial barriers to the movement of goods,
services, and capital throughout the hemisphere, in effect extending NAFTA to the
southern tip of South America. The United States has also pledged to Chile, the most
advanced and liberalized economy in Latin America, that it would be first in line to
become a full member of NAFTA. Without fast-track authority, Canada and the
nations of Latin America will continue to negotiate free trade agreements among
themselves, leaving the United States to confront discriminatory tariffs against its
exports.
· In November 1994, representatives of the 18 members of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum agreed to eliminate barriers to trade among the region’s more
advanced economies by 2010, and among all APEC members by 2020. Without fast
track, the United States would be unable to participate in any formal negotiations for
the mutual elimination of trade barriers in a region that includes the world’s fastest
growing markets.
· Multilateral talks on eliminating barriers to trade in agriculture will begin in 1999, as
agreed in the Uruguay Round of GATT. If the United States--the world’s largest
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exporter of agricultural products--lacks the ability to implement a final agreement, it
is difficult to imagine those negotiations succeeding. A historic opportunity to bring
free trade to a sector that has long known protection and government control may be
lost for years to come.
· The Uruguay Round calls for negotiations to lower barriers to trade in a number of
important sectors, such as maritime transport, construction and engineering,
professional services, and government procurement. Fast-track authority will
probably be necessary for any such agreements that require a change in U.S. law.
Fast-track authority is about much more than adding Chile to NAFTA. The
agreements that could be negotiated under fast track open the dazzling possibility of free
trade with the world’s most dynamic economies within the next 15 years, and a dramatic
reduction in barriers in those sectors in which the United States has historically enjoyed a
competitive edge.
Conclusion
Without fast-track authority for the president, the United States will be unable to
join in bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements to lower barriers to trade. And
without those agreements, momentum toward freer trade could be in jeopardy. Americans
would lose the potential benefits of greater liberty and prosperity that would come from
expanded opportunities to trade.
In a better world, governments would leave their citizens free to engage in trade
with people in other nations. Trade agreements would be unnecessary. But because
protectionism remains an option, trade agreements serve as useful tools to create
domestic support for free trade while restricting the ability of governments unilaterally to
raise trade barriers.
Congress should reject any attempt to tie trade agreements down with demands
for tougher labor and environmental rules. Such demands will prove ineffective in
achieving their goals while undermining efforts to liberalize trade.
Passage of a clean fast-track bill will advance the cause of free trade, enhancing
the liberty and living standards of people in the United States and the rest of the world.
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